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The study discusses a triggering issue of those Indonesian Muslims who 
frequently feel uneasy to socialize with other Muslims with Arabic looks to 
neutralize Islamic brotherhood in the Indonesian context of unity in diversity. A 
survey was made available online for over three months to get public responses 
concerning the issue. Sixty-two responses were collected for further analysis. 
Findings of the study revealed that most of the respondents expressed fear of 
Arabic looks because of terrorism-related activities resulting in deep personal 
hates. Fears were also felt due to the image that such a group of Muslims have 
deteriorated the local cultures of Indonesian origins. Still, others expressed fears 
of those distinctive individual Muslims because of a frequent political 
demonstration staged by those types of Muslims against engineered issues caused 
by discrepancies in political views to terminate the President. The authors offer 
recommendations for those with such Islam phobia to learn more about the truth 
of Islam from distinguished clerics from recognized Muslim organizations or to 
read Islamic literature to create peace of mind amid the wrong mindset about 
Islam, and finally to put aside egocentrism in the spirit of unity in diversity, only 
to fight against radicalism. 
Keywords: Islamic looks, egocentrism, radicalism  
 
Introduction  
Historically, Islam started to grow in Indonesia (Nusantara) near the end of 
the Majapahit Kindom of King Brawijaya V whose son, Raden Patah founded the 
first Islamic Kingdom of Demak (Mussadun, 2019). Governance of Islamic 
Kingdom was strictly practised under of the Wali Sanga—nine charismatic clerks 
whose main duty was to be responsible for the spread of Islam across the 
Indonesian archipelago while to serve as the members of the advisory board to 
Raden Patah, King of Demak Islamic Kingdom (1500-1518). Not only did the 
King perform in state-related duties but also act as a religious leader (Zamharir et 
al., 2020) 
 





Except for Sunan Kalijaga, the other eight clerks were dressed like 
Arabians—robes, turbans, beards, beads, and any other thing related to Arabic 
attributes.  Sunan Kalijaga maintained to wear black traditional clothes he created 
by himself similar to Chinese traditional clothes. In Indonesian movies about the 
struggle of Islam, the Walisanga were characterized as being powerful and 
charismatic individuals with Islam-based magical strengths. They were good at 
self-defence and traditional medical practices. Each Wali had special expertise, 
for example, Sunan Giri was an expert of making Gamelan music instrument 
aimed to promote Islam (Rahayu et al., 2020) While laymen were characterized as 
marginalized—wearing only shorts and headgears without having Islam-based 
magical power. 
The Walisanga were highly respected due to their wisdom and superpower—
being viewed as those close to Allah, the Almighty. This group of religious clerks 
and their communities were referred to as the first group of Islamic historioFig.y 
in Indonesia called traditional historioFig.y, characterized by religious and 
magical aspects (Fatiyah and Hariyanto, 2018). This group of clerks employed 
local wisdom in the spread of Islam—evolutionary than revolutionary (Kasdi, 
2017), assimilating the local cultures with Islamic teaching. Therefore, laypeople 
behaviorally practice traditional rituals but with the Arabic (Islamic) prayers  
(Fatiyah and Hariyanto, 2018) and sometimes a mixed language between a local 
language and Arabic to produce new yet powerful prayers (mantra). Concerning 
the legal practice, such as Shalat, a five-time-a-day standard of Islamic ritual, 
Javanese Muslims, for example, maintain the original rituals. In other words, they 
maintain the 5 pillars of Islam.  
In this respect, a new term “Islam Kejawen” (Javanese Islam) was coined to 
accommodate their religious practices. It is sometimes called “Islam Abangan” 
(Reddish Islam) which is, somehow, related to Clerks,  Sunan Kalijaga or Syekh 
Siti Jenar (Susilo and Syato, 2016).  
To accommodate the practices of ‘naturalized’ or traditional Islam, an Islamic 
group or mass organization called “Nahdatul Ulama” (NU for short) was 
established by K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari, on 
January 31, 1926, in Surabaya, East Java to preserve traditional Islam, 
institutionalized in Pesantren (Islamic Boarding Schools). It had something to do 
with preparing Indonesia for its independence, for example by “banning the 
Muslim youths from entering the Dutch military service, prohibiting the Muslims 
from supporting the Dutch army, and rejecting the Dutch aid which was offered to 
the Nahdlatul Ulama’s madrasas” (Ismail, 2011). The NU Santris (students/ 
disciples) have been so far those of the grassroots even though at the moment one 
of them managed to get the second-highest position in the government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Vice President, KH. Ma’ruf Amin. Some others have 
got several good positions in both the private and governmental sectors.  
However, in Indonesia there was also a group of Muslims who initiated a 
positive movement or renaissance (if it may be called so) or modernism, to return 
to the original teaching of Prophet Mohammad (Peace be upon him). In 1912, it 
was KH. Ahmad Dahlan who established a mass organization of Muslim 
accredited by the Sultanate and Dutch colonial government—14 years before the 
establishment of NU. His mission was to modernize Islam. Thus, Muhammadiyah 
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was often referred to as a modernist Islamic and educational organization to 
synergize with its struggles (Kim, 2010).  
Viewed from its legal standing, NU stood against Dutch colonial government 
while Muhammadiyah was accredited by the Sultanate and Dutch colonial 
government. It was good for the Dutch to be able to divide Muslims into these two 
big mass organization. However, it remains a history leading to the independence 
of Indonesia. The authors are pretty sure they contributed a lot to the achievement 
of Indonesia's independence in their ways (Ismail, 2011).  There used to be 
discrepancies between these two big mass organizations in political views, 
religious practices. Extremely speaking, in one neighbourhood, there was one 
mosque for Muhammadiyah followers and another mosque for NU practitioners. 
But now, they could cooperate in some ways under the spirit of unity in diversity 
as seen in their cooperation against radicalism in Jember (Amal, 2016). In other 
words, these two mass Muslim organizations have similar grounds for ‘hand in 
hand’ developing the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). 
NU and Muhammadiyah along with their sympathizers, including non-
Muslim groups of people have now been fighting against radicalism, to be exact 
Islamic radicalism (Fealy, 2004). The role of women was important in anti-
radicalism movement as revealed in Cirebon assuming that women were most 
often used as perpetrators with a feminine approach  It was argued that women 
should be positioned distinctively high by developing religious literacy, changing 
the paradigm of communication, reviewing and updating learning curriculum, and 
socializing with other religious groups and setting institutional net-working  
(Gumiandari and Nafi’a, 2020).  
However, due to the complexity of Muslims, the program found it hard to 
implement. Some individuals, assumed to be the "radical" people themselves, 
started questioning the definition of 'radicalism'. The government, religion 
ministry, found it complicated to answer such a 'misleading' question. The 
progress of anti-radicalism movement seems to be stagnant; moreover within 
which the global COVID-19 pandemic broke out (Sohrabi et al., 2020) to shake 
the whole world without exception.  
It was argued that to identify radicalism acts was not difficult at all (Sirry, 
2020). Upon the fall of Soeharto in 1998, particular groups of radical Muslims 
described as ‘white-robed and turbaned Muslim militiamen’ have found a rather 
smooth path for their struggle for immediate implementation of Syari’ah law. 
They simply staged a political demonstration in front of the Parliament, shouting 
“Allahu Akbar!!” explicitly implying "God, the Greatest", but implicitly meaning 
“Kill, Go to hell, Kafir., and any other form of hate speech. Another example as 
set out by Mietzner was that Arab-Indonesian Islamic "clerics" were threatening 
to "sweep" foreigners from Indonesia (Mietzner, 2018). Other cases, such as 
sweeping places of interests, restaurants open on Ramadhan day-time, have been 
around up to now to be exact during the era of reformation (Adi et al., 2019). 
In Jokowi’s administration, both in his first and second half of presidency, 
radicalism has been everywhere—off-line through political demonstrations 
performed by 212 Alumni, financed by anonymous opposing elites, hate speeches 
by particular clerks and online through producing hoaxes and hate speeches in 
social media. The government’s tolerance to these “democratic” activities had 
been wrongly translated as if they could have done anything freely without rules.  
 





We would not like to mention any names of groups or individuals to protect their 
privacy. 
The problem to which we would like to respond is the silent majority 
consisting of people under pressure, in fear of Islamic looks who are now 
marginalized as foreigners in their motherland.   
 
Method  
A survey (Google Form) in Bahasa Indonesia was made available online for 
over four hours to get public responses regarding the issue of radicalism in the 
Indonesian context. Fifty-five to fifty-eight responses—depending on the items—
.returned for further analysis. We would mention the number of responses in each 
item. Based on the results of the analysis and discussion, we would offer 
recommendations for the betterment of life in Indonesia under the spirit of unity 
in diversity. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
Narrated below is a discussion on the findings of the survey conducted 
through Google Form. There were 58 responses for further analysis. The results of 
the survey are presented in Figures of Pies for ease of description.   
Radicalism in Indonesia 
Below is Figure 1 representing the existence of radicalism in Indonesia. 
 
Figure 1. Radicalism in Indonesia 
Fig. 1 shows that most of the 58 respondents (86.2%) believe that there is 
radicalism in Indonesia and only 12.8% doubted that there was radicalism in 
Indonesia. This low percentage indicates that the respondents may not be 
interested in this kind of issue. However, none of them gave negative responses. 
Thus, it is very clear that radicalism does exist in Indonesia.  Precaution is 
therefore of high necessity.  Radical people will attempt anything possible to 
create chaotic situations against the legal government.  
Have they done so? They have. We think it is still fresh how they protested 
against the parliament on the legislation of Pancasila Ideology Guide (HIP) staged 
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by a group of radical people organized under PA 212 Islamists. Even though the 
government had expressed “disagreement” against the legislation, their 
demonstration went on. Their primary interest is not in the legislation of HIP or 
whatever but to terminate the legal government. It was overheard in their oration 
that they wanted to topple down President Jokowi and to ban PDIP (Democratic 
Party of Struggle), the President’s primary political supporter.   Such a situation 
has been politically predicted (Lane, 2019). 
The Main Characteristics of Radicalism  
Regarding what characterizes ‘radicalism’ is shown in Fig. 2 below 
 
Figure 2. The Main Characteristic of Radicalism 
Radicalism is characterized as opposing the current government for a 
particular purpose. Therefore, the majority of the 58 respondents (91.4%) justified 
that radicalism refers to an idealism that opposes the current government as also 
further justified in  Oxford dictionary defines 'radicalism' as (in politics) a belief 
favouring fundamental reforms (Horby, 1987). In other words, radical people are 
those who oppose the government regarding whatever policies or achievements it 
has made. They tend to ignore laws and regulation. Whenever the government 
makes blunders or policy malpractices, they will launch severe even illogical 
protests. This situation is not at all favourable in any country. It is, therefore, 
logical to assume/believe that radicalism has to be eradicated. In this context, 
Jokowi's administration has been in the right track to have an anti-radical policy 
even though it is stagnant as possibly caused by the outbreak of Coronavirus-19 














Perceived radicalism can be seen in Fig. 3 below: 
   
Figure 3. Perceived Radicalism 
Radical Islamists in Indonesia—though not applicable to all Islamists—are 
identified by how they are dressed, namely as white-robed and turbaned Muslim 
militiamen. For women, they are robed and fully-veiled (left only two eyes). In 
this survey, on being next to people dressed as such, the 58 respondents are 
relatively distributed. Most of them (48.3%) feel uneasy; 36.2% of them ignore; 
while the last 14.5%f them feel just fine. Surprisingly, there is a majority of the 
feeling of fear among people when socializing with people of Arabic looks—
wearing Arabic attributes. We term this 'Islam-phobia’ in which we fell strange or 
foreign in our own country when confronted with such looks. In this respect, a 
variety of reactions may occur, such as leaving them alone, feeling discomforts, 
but unable to do anything. The ‘displaced selves’ can be the right term, without 
physical and spiritual comforts.  
Personal Judgment on Radical Demos 
Regarding personal judgment, displayed below is Fig. 4, representing how 
respondents judged radical demos organized by the 212 radical groups. 
 
Figure 4. Personal Judgment on Radical Demos 
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Seen from Fig.4, most of the 58 respondents (91.4%) expressed discomforts 
regarding radical demos regularly staged. Only very recently did they stage 
another demo in front of on Parliament Building, in demand for cancellation of  
'Pancasila Ideology Guide' legislation as they claimed 'related to communism, a 
set-back issue to frighten people. Historically, they should have remembered that 
in Soeharto's regime, there was the legislation of  P4 (Guide to Internalization and 
Implementation of Pancasila) which turned out to be a tool to maintain Soeharto's 
status quo. 
The other 8.6% of the respondents expressed 'ignorance' regarding the 
multiple radical demos. At the moment, it can be assumed that they have been fed 
up by such silly and useless activities. 
Personal Worries on Radicalism 
Personal worries on radical demos are also of concern. Demos consume 
energy from both parts—the government and the radical people. We would like to 
know the respondents' views on such multiple demos. The results are revealed in 
Figure 5. below: 
 
Figure 5.  Personal Worries on Radical Demo 
Surprisingly, most of the 58 respondents (65.5%) expressed worries about 
(1) the cost of security and public facilities destructions.  The later can be 
minimized since the 212 radical group claim to be such a professional 
demonstrator leaving no public facilities destroyed. What about how much money 
the government must lose in, for example, one day demo? It was argued that the 
Government spent IDR 100 million.  Such a big amount of money, which can be 
used to build a hospital in Papua, President Jokowi quoted as saying.  However, 
the second high proportion (32.8%) is still to safeguard public facilities next to the 
government’s budgeting on demo. 
Personal Emotive Attitude in Arabic Looks (in Men) 
Presented below is Figure 6. regarding the personal emotive attitudes on 
Arabic looks experienced by the respondents: 
 






Figure 6. Personal Emotive Attitudes on Arabic Looks (in Men) 
 
There were 57 respondents. Surprisingly, though with a little difference 
(3.5%), more respondents (45.6%) expressed ignorance of Arabic attributive 
clothes and the other (42.1%) expressed ‘fears’. The rest (8.8%) expressed 
‘respect with fears’.  Some of them have learned to socialize the ‘radical’ by 
expressing ignorance. It is quite similar to COVID-19 pandemic. After a certain 
period of 'large scale social restriction', we have to implement 'new normal' with a 
strict protocol of social distancing.   
We never know how they feel to have to make social interaction with people 
of different cultural attributes. We hope that they are doing just fine. Fearful 
individuals (42.6%) are exactly the displaced ‘selves.’ They have lost their 
freedom to live in their country. They are probably frightened by possible blasts at 
one time or another. They are not to blame at all.  What about another proportion 
(54.6%)? The choice ‘ignorance’ needs clarification but for the time being, we 
assume that they are doing social distancing with Muslims of Arabic attributes.   
Personal Emotive Attitude in Arabic Looks (in Women) 
On personal emotive attitude regarding Arabic looks (in women), Figure 7. 
below represents the respondents’ responses. 
 
Figure 7. Personal Emotive Attitudes on Arabic Looks (in women) 
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To our surprise, a significant proportion (50.9%) of the 55 respondents 
expressed “respect with fear” regarding women dressed in robes and full veils 
over their faces with only two eyes left open. Meanwhile, 41.8% of the 
respondents expressed ‘hates’. The rest (7.3%) expressed ‘fear’.  The current 
study should have been accompanied by in-depth interviews with respondents. 
The problem that it was not, was that the study took place in the time of COVID-
19 pandemic. 
Personal Assumptions on Radicalism 
We also would like to find out the respondents’ personal assumptions on 
radicalism. Fig. 8 below represents their responses. 
 
Figure 8. Personal Assumptions on Radicalism 
Possibility of Radicalism Solution 
We are in particular questioning whether or not radicalism can be eradicated 
from Indonesian dreamland. Fig. 9 below illustrates the respondents’ responses. 
 
Figure 9. Possibility of Radicalism Solution 
Most of the 57 respondents (75.4%) are very optimistic about the possibility 
of radicalism solution. Meanwhile, 22.8% of the respondents remain 'in-between' 
namely adding up another possibility. Only very few respondents are pessimistic 
about the possibility of radicalism solution. We are committed to excellence to 
their optimism under unity in diversity, driving away racial, religious differences.  
Cross-regional cooperation among people of different religions is required to 
realize the optimism to eradicate radicalism from Indonesian motherland. It 
 





should be remembered that radicalism is not always related to any particular 
religion. It can belong to any group of people with a view to making a chaotic 
condition without logical thinking. In other words, it is about ego-centrism of one 
identical fanatics. Once a group of people were radically indoctrinated, it takes a 
very long time to neutralize them to be ordinary people.  We have to solve the 
problems comprehensively, never partially. With our full efforts, we hope to 
finalize everything to help the government realize its national program without 
any obstacles.       
Parties to Solve Radicalism Problems 
We would like to know the respondents’ views regarding who would be 
responsible for solving radicalism problems. What are the real/factual problems 
of radicalism? Included in the problems are (1) to convert the radical people to  
normal people, meaning that they would be just like ordinary Muslims without 
any political practices, (2) to help the marginalized Muslims who are identified as 
being in fear of other Muslims with full Arabic attributes though they may not 
perform radical activities.  
This is of great importance since full Arabic attributes have become an 
enigmatic social judgment as “belonging to terrorists’. Although, it should be 
kept in mind that wearing full Arabic attributes does not necessarily mean 
‘radical’, only by gradual process would those marginalized individuals be 
naturalized. Any phobia cannot be cured in a single day. It needs processes. Fig. 
10 below illustrates who would be responsible for solving radicalism problems. 
 
Figure 10. Party to Solve Radicalism Problems 
The last item to discuss is “Who will be responsible for solving radicalism 
problems?”  We offer three choices of responses. Our assumption is correct as the 
majority of the 58 respondents (77.6%) expressed a choice that it is the 
responsibility of the government and the people to solve radicalism problems. 
Meanwhile, 13.8% of them expressed that it was the government’s sole 
responsibility to solve the radicalism problems, and ironically the rest (8.6%) 
expressed a personal concern that it was the people’s responsibility to solve the 
problems. 
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It is still a good idea that the majority of people still realize the importance 
of cooperation between the government and the whole population of our beloved 
NKRI (the republic of Indonesia). 
 
Conclusion 
Despite increasing confidence in the success of gigantic foreign company 
acquisitions, overall development of infrastructure (Negara, 2016), including the 
betterment of transportation system, digital business management, improved 
banking and economic sectors (Primadini, 2018) an upgrade of income per capita,  
Indonesia is now encountering two different problems, concerning its political 
stability—Jokowi’s presidential position and silent majority’s fear of Islamic 
radicalism, parasites destroying Islam from within. 
Despite frequent failures, including religious blasphemy in the case of Ahok 
(Peterson, 2020),   radical groups of the opposition have been struggling to 
terminate Joko Widodo’s presidency. However, he is still under Allah's 
protection. Every bit of their actions against Jokowi's presidential position hit 
nothing. At this point, we have to increase our precautions against all possibilities 
of occurrence regarding the safety of our nation, in particular, to secure Jokowi's 
presidency. We are happy that the president himself is not over-reactive about 
political bullying, be they in the form of hate speech, privacy, regular demos and 
the like. He remains calm but cautious. 
The silent majority of people are in fear of Islamic looks demonstrated daily 
by the radical groups of people, resulting in disgrace of local values and cultures. 
Anywhere in every corner are a number of Muslims dressed in full Arabic 
customs. This has resulted in a gradual loss of atmospheric looks of Indonesian 
Muslims in general. As well, the 2019 Presidential Election demonstrated high 
friction of national disintegration with religious-political contestation (Winarni et 
al., 2020). Some of us have been silenced to witness the disgrace of our cultural 
heritage. 
It is therefore important that religious preachers be restructured against 
producing hate speech that will bring about provocation ending in governmental 
chaos (Burhani, 2020).    Some people are not patient enough to see the slow 
responses of the government against radical oppositions who have signalled cruel 
attitudes and behaviours. They always compare the steps that would be taken in 
Suharto's Order Baru against such a group of intolerance and radicalism. We may 
forget that we are now living in a different era with a different security model. 
Silent majority of people in fear of radical looks have realized that they 
cannot do anything without the support of the authority. It is recommended that 
they learn more about Islam from charismatic and dignified Islamic scholars 
preferably from any of the two big mass Muslim organizations—NU or 
Muhammadiyah. Each of them has demonstrated a commitment of excellence to 
safeguard Indonesia before and after Indonesia's independence. They can simply 
ignore the existence of those who would jeopardize Indonesia. They have to 
believe that everything is going to be all right under the current government of 
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